Lumbar Spinal Injury

Published on: June 30, 2024

Plaintiff’s lawsuit dismissed; defendant argued lack of serious injury. Peart v. Carreras, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 2600 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024)

by Stephen Bilkis

Peart v. Carreras, originating from a motor vehicle collision, focused on the complexities of proving the severity and causation of injuries. As with any personal injury case, the plaintiff must show that the injury suffered was serious. A serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) refers to an injury meeting statutory criteria, such as permanent loss or significant limitation of bodily functions, permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member, significant disfigurement, or a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature.

Background Facts

The lawsuit stemmed from an incident in which the plaintiff claimed to have sustained severe injuries to multiple areas of his body, including the cervical spine, lumbar spine, thoracic spine, left shoulder, and other limbs, following a motor vehicle accident. Central to the defendants’ defense was the presentation of medical reports and expert testimony. Their orthopedic surgery expert’s evaluation indicated normal ranges of motion in the plaintiff’s claimed injury sites, with no signs of tenderness or other abnormalities. Additionally, analysis of the plaintiff’s MRIs suggested no acute injuries to the spinal areas or left shoulder, instead identifying degenerative conditions unrelated to the accident’s impact. Moreover, a biomechanical engineering expert suggested that the low impact of the collision was insufficient to cause the injuries alleged by the plaintiff.

Published on: June 30, 2024

Court assessed whether injuries were serious as required by insurance law. Massillon v. Regalado, 176 A.D.3d 600 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)

by Stephen Bilkis

A 90/180-day claim typically refers to a type of claim under New York’s No-Fault Insurance Law (Insurance Law § 5102(d)). It involves an assertion by a plaintiff that they suffered a qualifying injury that impaired their ability to perform substantially all of their daily activities for at least 90 out of the 180 days following a motor vehicle accident. This claim is significant because it can affect the determination of whether a plaintiff meets the threshold for “serious injury” under New York law, which is required to bring a lawsuit for damages beyond basic no-fault benefits.

In the case of Massillon v. Regalado, the Supreme Court of Bronx County considered issues related to the 90/180-claim rule as well as whether the plaintiff suffered a serious injury as defined by insurance law.

Background Facts

Published on: June 30, 2024

In a car accident case, defendants argued plaintiff didn’t meet the serious injury threshold. Martinez v. Hillard, 2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 32204 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2022)

by Stephen Bilkis

When it comes to recovering damages in a personal injury lawsuit, the plaintiff must be able to prove that they suffered serious injuries. In the case of Martinez v. Hillard, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit to recover damages for injuries she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiff failed to meet the “serious injury” threshold defined by New York Insurance Law §5102(d).

Background Facts

Manuela Martinez, the plaintiff, was involved in a car accident on July 12, 2019, while traveling on City Island Road near Park Drive in Bronx, New York. She was driving a vehicle that was rear-ended by a bus operated by John A. Santana and owned by Lorinda Enterprises. Martinez claimed she sustained significant injuries to her right shoulder, cervical spine, and lumbar spine due to the accident.

Published on: June 30, 2024

Plaintiff alleged injuries to lumbar spine, cervical spine, left shoulder in car accident. Diarra v. City Bronx Leasing Two Inc., 2021 N.Y. Slip Op. 34011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2021)

by Stephen Bilkis

In the case of Diarra v. City Bronx Leasing Two Inc., the plaintiff, Ibrahima Diarra, alleged injuries from a motor vehicle accident. The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss Diarra’s complaint, arguing that she failed to meet the “serious injury” threshold as defined by New York Insurance Law §5102(d). The plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendants.

Background Facts

Ibrahima Diarra was involved in a motor vehicle accident on August 18, 2018, while traveling southbound on Bronx River Avenue and East 174th Street in Bronx, New York. Diarra’s vehicle was struck from the rear by a vehicle operated by Nelson M. Sanchez. At the time of the accident, Diarra had an automobile insurance policy with Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, which included coverage for bodily injury and Supplementary Uninsured Motorist (SUM) benefits.

Published on: February 24, 2013

In this case, plaintiffs filed an action to recover damages

by Stephen Bilkis

In this case, plaintiffs filed an action to recover damages against the defendants for the injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff in a car accident on February 16, 2009, on Motor Parkway at or near its intersection with Express Drive North, County of Suffolk, State of New York, when Plaintiff was operating his vehicle and it was struck by the vehicle owned by defendants.

Plaintiff alleged that he sustained injuries consisting of, inter alia, lumbar disc herniation at L4-5 impinging on the anterior aspect of the spinal canal and the nerve roots bilaterally; lumbar sprain and strain with muscle spasms, severe pain, tenderness, swelling, and permanent and significant restriction and limitation of motion; posterior disc herniation at C5-6 and C6-7 abutting the anterior aspect of the spinal cord; possible cervical radiculopathy; cervical sprain, strain, with muscle spasms, severe pain, swelling, tenderness, and permanent and/or significant restriction and limitation of motion; right knee sprain, strain, contusion; peripatellar bursitis; severe pain, swelling, tenderness, and permanent and/or significant restriction and limitation of motion.

The defendants sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the basis that the injuries claimed failed to meet the threshold imposed by Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Published on: February 4, 2013

A man working as a millwright for a saw mill in Florida had been working at the same saw mill

by Stephen Bilkis

A man working as a millwright for a saw mill in Florida had been working at the same saw mill for the past twenty-four years. His job required him to do heavy manual labor consisting of bending from the waist to lift heavy objects and carrying the heavy objects. As time went on, the millwright gradually experienced pain in his right leg and hip. There was no specific incident that caused any spinal injury to the millwright during the course of his employment. The pain soon interfered with his duties at the saw mill and this prompted him to consult an orthopedic surgeon who immediately placed him on no-work status and referred him to a neurologist for testing.

The Long Island neurologist ran medical tests and scans on the man’s spine. The tests showed that the man had stenosis or a narrowing or choking of the spinal nerve roots in his neck and lower back. The compression of the spinal nerve roots cause the shooting pain in his hip and right leg. Spinal stenosis is a degenerative disease that occurs from repetitive bending and lifting of heavy objects.

The neurologist and the orthopedic surgeon both found that the man suffered from a degenerative disk disease and L3-4 herniated disk. They advised the millwright to take medication, sufficient rest and physical therapy to stop the pain and to arrest the further damage to his spine. The employer refused to pay the millwright’s claim for compensation and filed a complaint with the Compensation Commission.

Published on: January 20, 2013

This medical malpractice action commenced on behalf of the plaintiff

by Stephen Bilkis

This medical malpractice action commenced on behalf of the plaintiff is premised upon the alleged negligence of defendants in the placement of spinal cordstimulator leads, and the alleged departures from good and accepted standards of care relative thereto, causing plaintiff to suffer a spinal injury, loss of motor function bilaterally, the inability to walk requiring the use of a wheelchair, loss of sensation and reflexes, hypersensitivity, incontinence of bowel and bladder, exacerbation of prior conditions, diminution of a chance of recovery, inability to work, conscious pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life. It is undisputed that on January 26, 2007, the plaintiff came under the care and treatment of an anesthesiologist, the defendant, for pain management relative to a history of leg pain and pain in her right upper extremity. Implantation of a spinal cord stimulator was recommended for which she was admitted to the Hospital at Syosset on February 27, 2007.

A Lawyer said that, the Long Islanddefendants seek summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the bases that they fully complied with the standard of care during the care and treatment of plaintiff and that they did not cause or contribute to the plaintiff’s spinal injuries. The Hospital further contends that it is not responsible for the actions of the private attending physicians rendering care to plaintiff.

The issue in this case is whether defendants are guilty of medical malpractice, and thus, liable for the spinal injuries sustained by the plaintiff.

Published on: December 27, 2012

The complaint of this action sets forth causes of action sounding in medical malpractice,

by Stephen Bilkis

The Bronx complaint of this action sets forth causes of action sounding in medical malpractice, lack of informed consent asserted on behalf of the complainant woman and a derivative claim asserted on behalf of her spouse. It is claimed that the accused parties negligently departed from good and accepted standards of medical/surgical/anesthesia care and treatment when the complainant woman was admitted to the hospital for a scheduled right total hip replacement due to osteoarthritis and lack of blood flow on the right hip, and failed to inform her of the risks and complications associated with the surgery, anesthesia, and treatment with an anti-coagulant drug. It is claimed that due to the negligence of the orthopedic surgeon, the anesthesiologist and the hospital, the woman was caused to suffer extensive bleeding in the area of the lumbar plexus and to sustain serious injury and nerve damage resulting in right lower extremity weakness, foot drop, and numbness due to the failure of the accused parties to properly and timely treat her condition. It is further claimed that the accused doctors and hospital failed to properly provide information concerning the risks, benefits and complications to her to enable her to give an informed consent. The orthopedic surgeon performed the hip replacement, the anesthesiologist administered the spinal anesthesia for the surgery, and postoperative placed a lumbar plexus block and peripheral nerve block.

The moving doctors and hospital seek an order granting summary judgment dismissing the complaint asserted against them on the basis they did not deviate from good and accepted standards of care during the care and treatment and admission of the woman which proximately caused the claimed injuries she suffered.

The accused orthopedic surgeon and anesthesiologist individually submitted their attorney’s affirmation; the affidavit, copies of the summons and complaint, answer, amended answer; the complainants’ verified bill of particulars; and copies of the transcripts of the examinations before trial It is noted that the deposition transcripts of the two doctors are not in admissible form and are not accompanied by an affidavit pursuant to the Civil Practice Laws and Rules, and therefore, are not considered.

Published on: December 19, 2012

The Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) appeals the trial court’s final

by Stephen Bilkis

The Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) appeals the trial court’s final judgment against DCF finding DCF negligent and awarding the complainants as guardians and adoptive parents of a child, the sum of $26,849,849.06. DCF raises several issues on appeal that the Appellate Court affirms without comment. The Court of Appeals addresses only DCF’s argument that the complainants failed to prove a legitimate case of negligence. It affirmed the final judgment because the complainants presented competent substantial evidence that DCF was negligent and that the negligence was the proximate cause of the spinal injuries sustained by two-year-old child.

The vast majority of the material facts in this case are undisputed. DCF first became involved in this case when representatives at the Miami Children’s Hospital (MCH) called the DCF hotline because the child’s biological mother failed to come to the hospital on December 8, 2000, the date of the child’s discharge. A Suffolk woman, who is the DCF protective investigator assigned to the case, began her formal investigation on December 9, 2000. She testified that she was concerned that the mother did not show up to the hospital on the date of the child’s discharge because she was more interested in getting her boyfriend out of jail, that the mother hardly ever visited or called the hospital while the child was hospitalized for a month, that the hospital had difficulty getting the mother to come to the hospital and sign consents, that when the mother did come to the hospital the child would cry and the mother spanked the child in her hospital bed while the child cried, and that the hospital informed the investigator that the child did not appear very bonded to the mother. In her testimony, the investigator expressed concern because the child’s x-ray results showed a fractured clavicle, for which the mother had no explanation. The investigator also testified that the mother’s boyfriend was living with the mother and the child, and in her training and experience as a DCF protective investigator, boyfriends who live in the home with the child and are not related by blood or marriage to the child are a safety risk to the child because they are not the child’s natural father and have been responsible for abuse situations.

Due to concerns that the mother was not going to be able to provide the necessary follow-up care for her child, the investigator, the mother, and the head of the child advocacy team (CAT) at the hospital met at the hospital on December 11, 2000. The head of CAT testified that clavicle fractures are usually low risk and not of great concern; however, he was concerned because it was an unexplained injury. Although the CAT head testified that he had no recollection or notes of CAT reporting a concern of physical abuse to DCF, he wrote in his CAT consult that the child is a high risk child who should not be released to home until we can more fully insure that the environment is safe and nurturing. The Westchester investigator admitted in her testimony that the CAT head advised her that a home study should be completed first before the child was returned to her home. The investigator also testified that after meeting with the CAT head, she suspected physical abuse.

Published on: November 30, 2012

Claimant is a young woman who studied dancing most of her life

by Stephen Bilkis

Claimant is a young woman who studied dancing most of her life. She was employed as a dancer at a famous theme park owned by the appellant Company, for several years. She first injured her back during a dance routine on January 11, 1981. After a spinal injury operation, she went home to recuperate and eventually returned to work. She neither requested nor received any attendant care benefits while recuperating at home on this occasion.

An source said that, claimant sustained a second back spine injury when she was dropped by a fellow dancer. As a result of this spine injury, claimant underwent a low back spinal fusion operation, by an

Queens orthopedic surgeon approved by the appellant Company to provide medical treatment to claimant. Thereafter, claimant was discharged from the hospital to return home and recuperate. She was instructed to wear a full body cast, which greatly restricted her body movement, for one and one-half months following her discharge from the hospital. The cast, although described as “removable,” was to be worn at all times except while bathing and taking care of personal hygiene. Claimant was not advised that her worker’s compensation benefits would cover necessary attendant care during this period. Claimant normally lived alone in her own home, but she had made arrangements to temporarily reside with a friend who agreed to provide her care and assistance with such things as going to the bathroom, bathing, dressing, eating, cooking, changing her bed, and other necessary daily functions that claimant was unable to perform for herself while in the cast.